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Rethinking the Cyber Domain 
and Deterrence
By Dorothy E. Denning
A
s the Department of Defense 
(DOD) formulates strategy 
and doctrine for operating in 
cyberspace, it is vital to understand 
the domain and how it relates to the 
traditional domains of land, sea, air, 
and space. While cyberspace has dis-
tinct technologies and methods, it 
shares many characteristics with the 
traditional domains, and some of the 
conventional wisdom about how cyber-
space differs from them does not hold 
up under examination.
These similarities are especially 
relevant when it comes to strategies for 
deterrence. Just as any attempt to de-
velop a single deterrence strategy for all 
undesirable activity across the traditional 
domains would be fraught with difficulty, 
so too for cyberspace. Yet this is how 
many authors have approached the topic 
of deterrence in cyberspace. Instead, by 
focusing on particular cyber weapons that 
are amenable to deterrence or drawing 
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from existing deterrence regimes, the 
issues become more tractable.
But first, two key attributes of cyber-
space must be examined, as they show 
why cyberspace strongly resembles tradi-
tional domains. These are the roles played 
by man vs. nature and the malleability of 
the domains. Other similarities across the 
domains are described later in the context 
of deterrence.
Man and Nature
Conventional wisdom holds that 
cyberspace is made by man, whereas 
the traditional domains were created by 
nature. This is reflected in the Depart-
ment of Defense Strategy for Operating 
in Cyberspace: “Although it is a man-
made domain, cyberspace is now as 
relevant a domain for DoD activities as 
the naturally occurring domains of land, 
sea, air, and space.”1 General Michael 
Hayden, USAF (Ret.), former Director 
of the National Security Agency and 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
similarly noted: “the other domains are 
natural, created by God, and this one is 
the creation of man.”2
This distinction of manmade vs. natu-
ral permeates the cyber warfare literature. 
Martin Libicki, a senior management 
scientist at the RAND Corporation and 
one of the leading thinkers about cyber 
warfare, writes, “Everyone concedes that 
cyberspace is man-made. This is what 
makes it different from its predecessors.”3
While it is certainly true that cy-
berspace would not exist without the 
computers and networks created by 
man, all domains of warfare, with the 
possible exception of land, are fundamen-
tally manmade. The maritime domain 
would not exist without boats, the air 
domain without planes, and the space 
domain without rockets and satellites. 
Indeed, these domains, along with their 
respective military forces, were created 
only after the introduction of naval 
vessels, military aircraft, and spacecraft, 
respectively. Even the domain of land is 
substantially manmade. Although land 
forces could in principle fight it out with 
sticks and stones, and move only on foot 
or the backs of horses and camels, they 
instead deploy a plethora of manmade 
tools, vehicles, and weapons to support 
operations over terrain that has been 
substantially altered by man through the 
construction of roads, bridges, tunnels, 
buildings, canals, pipelines, and so on. 
Indeed, urban warfare takes place in an 
environment that is predominantly man-
made. Nature, and especially geography, 
still matter, but none of the traditional 
domains, including land, can be un-
derstood, let alone operationalized, in 
today’s world without accounting for the 
artifacts of mankind and the changes man 
has made to the environment.
At the same time, cyberspace has a 
substantial natural component. It relies 
heavily on electromagnetic waves, as 
well as natural elements such as silicon. 
Indeed, the electromagnetic spec-
trum—that is, the range of all possible 
wavelengths and their associated frequen-
cies, to include radio, infrared, and light 
waves—is crucial to communications 
in cyberspace. All communications, re-
gardless of whether they are transmitted 
through the air or over wires or optical 
fibers, take the form of electromagnetic 
waves. And even though these waves are 
generated by manmade devices that con-
vert digital information into continuously 
varying wave forms, they have the same 
physical makeup and are constrained by 
the same laws of physics as the naturally 
occurring ones in background radiation. 
Electromagnetic waves are to cyberspace 
much as land, water, air, and space are 
to the traditional domains of warfare. 
They are a medium for movement, in this 
case digital objects instead of people and 
equipment. The waves themselves travel 
through land, water, air, or space, so in a 
sense they are a medium within the other 
media—but then so too are rivers and 
canals with respect to land.
Computer networks, of course, are 
manmade. But they are like the manmade 
road and rail networks in the domain of 
land; both provide infrastructure over 
which much movement takes place. 
Moreover, just as the placement of roads 
and train tracks is strongly influenced by 
geography, so too is the placement of 
cyber infrastructure such as cell towers 
and cables.
There is another, perhaps even more 
fundamental reason why the man vs. 
nature dichotomy breaks down: all of 
the domains encompass more than just 
their physical manifestations. They are 
domains of human practice and, as such, 
constrained by the actions and decisions 
of humans. For example, even though 
the borders separating one country from 
another often follow natural geographic 
formations such as mountain ranges and 
bodies of water, they are set by man, 
as are the boundaries that separate one 
property owner from another within a 
country. Moreover, the legitimacy of 
these borders relies on human agree-
ments, which in turn are backed by 
manmade laws, regulations, and means 
of enforcement. International borders are 
often at the root of conflict, such as those 
involving Ukraine, Georgia, Kashmir, 
and islands in the South China Sea. But 
even when borders are not in dispute, 
conflict can emerge over other human 
agreements, especially those of national 
governance. The civil war in Syria and re-
cent coup in Thailand illustrate this fact.
Recognizing the role of humans 
in all domains of warfare is essential to 
understanding deterrence. Deterrence 
is fundamentally about influencing the 
decisions and actions (or inactions) taken 
by human beings, not nature. It is highly 
dependent on human agreements, both 
nationally and internationally.
At the international level, the Charter 
of the United Nations (UN) together 
with other international agreements, 
including the Geneva and Hague con-
ventions and customary international law, 
form a body of agreements referred to 
as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), 
which is concerned with state activity 
across all domains of warfare, prescribing 
conditions under which states may and 
may not use their military forces. State 
activity is also constrained by numerous 
other agreements that cover such areas 
as trade, travel, telecommunications, 
finance, the environment, energy, weap-
ons, crime, and embassies.
At the national level, domestic laws, 
regulations, contracts, and other types of 
agreements, together with various means 
of enforcement including police and the 
10 Forum / Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence JFQ 77, 2nd Quarter 2015
criminal justice system, restrict activity 
within a state’s borders. Within organiza-
tions, policies, procedures, and personnel 
agreements restrict the actions of their 
employees.
As domains of human practice, all do-
mains of warfare are further constrained 
by the skill and initiative of their human 
practitioners, and by the resources those 
practitioners are able to acquire to meet 
their objectives. Nature, by itself, will 
not engage a foreign adversary. Militaries 
must plan, resource, and execute their 
operations, whether in cyberspace or 
a traditional domain of warfare. While 
some of the skills needed to operate ef-
fectively in the cyber domain differ from 
those in other domains of warfare, other 
skills such as the ability to communicate 
effectively, work with others, build trust, 
and manage projects do not.
It is tempting to think that it is easier, 
cheaper, and faster to act in cyberspace 
than in traditional domains. After all, it 
is just a matter of moving, processing, 
and storing bits—not people and physical 
objects. But resources and skillsets matter 
as much in cyberspace as any other do-
main. Lacking adequate bandwidth, for 
example, it may be faster to move digital 
objects by downloading them to portable 
media and shipping the media than by 
sending them over a slow network. And 
surely one of the reasons why terrorists 
still prefer bombs to bytes is that it is 
easier for them to build and deploy 
explosives than to achieve comparable 
effects with cyber weapons. Developing 
a sophisticated cyber warfare capability 
requires considerable upfront investment.
Malleability
The manmade vs. nature distinction 
has led to a conclusion that cyberspace 
is easier to change than the traditional 
domains. General Hayden, for example, 
wrote, “Man can actually change this 
geography, and anything that happens 
there actually creates a change in 
someone’s physical space.”4 Libicki 
emphasized the importance of this 
aspect: “What matters is that cyberspace 
is highly malleable by its owners, hence 
its defenders, in ways other media are 
not.”5 If true, this would suggest that 
cyberspace might be more amenable to 
deterrence by denial, that is, through 
security defenses, than other domains of 
warfare.
While some things are easy to change 
in cyberspace, the overall malleability 
of the domain is severely limited by 
standards, interoperability requirements, 
legacy software, regulations, and the 
resources and inertia needed to make 
changes. The switch from version 4 to 
version 6 of the Internet Protocol (IP), 
for example, has been taking years. 
As of May 2014, the bulk of Internet 
traffic is still carried in version 4 packets, 
including over 96 percent of the traffic 
connecting to Google servers.6 There are 
NASA’s Mid-Infrared Instrument has camera and spectrograph that see light in mid-infrared region of electromagnetic spectrum (NASA/Chris Gunn/Rob Gutro)
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many reasons for the slow adoption, but 
a survey of industry professionals found 
that the top reasons were transition costs, 
compatibility issues, and security con-
cerns.7 The security issues are interesting; 
while version 6 mandates support for en-
cryption and authentication, it effectively 
breaks security products such as firewalls 
and intrusion prevention systems that 
were developed for version 4.
There are numerous other examples 
demonstrating the slow adoption of new 
Internet protocols and standards, in-
cluding ones that would thwart many of 
the cyber attacks that plague cyberspace 
today, such as denial-of-service and phish-
ing attacks that rely on spoofing an IP 
address, email account, or organization 
in cyberspace.8 In addition, organizations 
can be slow to adopt improved versions 
of operating systems and application 
software, as illustrated by the many in-
stallations still running Windows XP and 
applications built for it, and they can be 
slow to install security patches for pub-
lished vulnerabilities.
This lag in adoption is seen in indus-
trial control systems that operate critical 
infrastructure such as power generation 
and distribution, oil and gas distribution, 
and water treatment and distribution. 
Many of these systems run legacy soft-
ware that offers practically no security, 
but meets performance, reliability, and 
safety objectives that drove decisions be-
fore the threat of cyber attacks became an 
issue. To make matters worse, these sys-
tems are often connected to the Internet, 
exposing them to cyber threats for which 
they lack defenses. Operators may be 
reluctant to update and patch these sys-
tems for fear of breaking something and 
disrupting essential services.
Within the Federal Government, the 
ability to acquire new cyber technologies 
is hampered by procurement regulations. 
Acquisition delays of 5 to 10 years are not 
uncommon in the military.
The malleability of cyberspace is also 
constrained by the time and resources 
required to install infrastructure such 
as cables and satellites, as well as by the 
laws of nature. Fred Cohen, for example, 
showed three decades ago that it was im-
possible to develop a computer program 
that would detect any computer virus by 
either its appearance or its behavior.9
At the same time, traditional do-
mains of warfare, especially land, can be 
reasonably malleable. While building 
highways and bridges can take consid-
erable time, and mountains and forests 
are immovable, it can be relatively easy 
to make certain types of changes in 
some geographic areas—for example, 
to install surveillance equipment, plant 
and detonate explosives, and reposition 
troops—all of which can significantly im-
pact military operations. In all domains, 
militaries have to contend with change 
and uncertainty brought on by adversary 
actions and nature.
Cyberspace itself is also increasing 
the malleability of other domains of 
warfare. With additive manufacturing, 
also known as three-dimensional (3D) 
printing, it becomes possible to transform 
digital blueprints into physical weapons 
and other types of devices. Instead of 
building a device in a manufacturing 
plant in one country and then shipping it 
to a facility in another, a digital blueprint 
can be transmitted to a 3D printer at the 
intended destination.
Cyberspace has an advantage over 
the traditional domains in that if a cyber 
operation alters digital objects without 
affecting objects external to cyberspace, 
its effects can be undone by restoring the 
original bits. Thus, if a cyber operation 
shuts down a power generator by tam-
pering with bits in its control system, for 
example, it may be possible to restore 
power simply by resetting the bits. By 
contrast, if the generator is shut down 
with a bomb, it must be physically rebuilt 
or replaced. Additive manufacturing, 
however, may someday remove even 
some of this advantage.
Deterrence in Cyberspace
The literature on cyber deterrence 
reveals many challenges to the very 
concept.10 These include the:
 • difficulty of attributing cyber attacks 
to their perpetrators
 • ease of acquiring cyber weapons and 
conducting cyber attacks
 • broad scope of state and nonstate 
actors who engage in cyber attacks 
for a multitude of reasons and 
against both state and nonstate 
targets
 • short shelf life of many cyber 
weapons
 • difficulty of establishing thresholds 
and red lines for cyber aggression
 • difficulty of setting and enforcing 
international norms regarding cyber 
behavior
 • challenges associated with avoiding 
escalation.
Authors who have compared cyber 
deterrence with nuclear deterrence have 
generally found that the principles that 
have made nuclear deterrence effective 
for over half a century fall apart in 
cyberspace.11
One reason why the concept of cyber 
deterrence raises so many challenges is 
that the term is extremely broad. In no 
other domain of warfare do we address 
the topic of deterrence across an entire 
domain. There is no notion of “land 
deterrence,” “sea deterrence,” “air deter-
rence,” or “space deterrence.” Rather, we 
direct our attention to particular weapons 
and activity. Some of these may be tied 
to specific domains of warfare and even 
geographic areas, such as deterrence of 
Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, but 
others are not, such as deterrence of 
state-level aggression generally.
Consider nuclear deterrence. It is 
about a specific type of weapon, not a 
domain of warfare. In fact, it crosses all 
domains of warfare, as nuclear weap-
ons can be launched from land-based 
missiles, fired from submarines, or 
dropped from bombers against targets 
in any domain. The success of nuclear 
deterrence is contingent on the nature 
of the weapon, which inherently limits 
its casual development and deployment. 
Nuclear deterrence is directed primar-
ily at nation-states and, by extension, 
state-sponsored terrorists. It relies 
primarily on retaliation or punishment, 
including nuclear counterstrikes leading 
to mutually assured destruction. But 
nuclear deterrence also depends on 
restricting the states that have nuclear 
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arsenals and the spread of the knowledge 
and materials required to develop the 
weapons, sometimes called “deterrence 
by denial.” This in turn is supported by 
the establishment of international norms 
and agreements that limit the acquisition 
and use of nuclear technologies, such as 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 
1968. Both denial and norms can have 
a deterrent effect by dissuading parties 
from even attempting to acquire nuclear 
weapons.
In traditional domains of warfare, 
there are all sorts of nefarious activity that 
one would like to deter, including bomb-
ings, chemical and biological attacks, 
genocide, terrorism, armed invasions by 
foreign military forces, theft, bribery, 
fraud, extortion, embezzlement, insider 
trading, political corruption, arson, mur-
der, espionage, vandalism, kidnapping, 
sexual assault, child and elder abuse, and 
animal abuse. Some of this activity falls in 
the area of national security and military 
operations, but other activity falls in the 
area of domestic crime and law enforce-
ment. Given the enormous scope of the 
actors and activities involved, it would be 
difficult to develop an effective deterrence 
strategy that covered it all. Attempting 
to do so would inevitably raise many of 
the same problems that have surfaced in 
studies of cyber deterrence. For example, 
like many cyber weapons, many physical 
weapons, to include knives and guns, are 
easy to acquire and difficult to control. 
Street crimes such as vandalism, arson, 
and theft can be easy to commit but diffi-
cult to prevent and attribute.
Cyberspace is becoming as rich a 
domain of activity as land. It supports a 
large and ever growing set of operations 
relating to communication, finance, busi-
ness, commerce, education and training, 
research, entertainment, health care, 
the environment, energy, government, 
military operations, and more. And, 
like all domains of warfare, it is used for 
both civilian and military activity. To get 
our hands around deterrence in cyber-
space, we need to move beyond general 
statements about the domain as a whole 
to statements about situations where 
deterrence could play a meaningful role. 
One might argue that cyber deterrence is 
really about a particular type of weapon 
and not the domain, and in that regard its 
focus is similar to nuclear deterrence. But 
the comparison is not fair. Cyber weapons 
constitute the entire set of methods and 
tools that can produce effects in cyber-
space, ranging from simple weapons that 
are readily acquired and used by “script 
kiddies” with no real skill in the domain, 
to those that require an advanced capa-
bility to develop and successfully deploy, 
such as was the case with Stuxnet. They 
also range from weapons whose effects 
are minor to ones that could potentially 
lead to death. By contrast, nuclear 
weapons are a highly lethal subset of all 
explosives, and explosives in turn are 
just a subset of all the physical weapons 
that can produce effects in traditional 
domains.
Just as we do not sweep all physical 
weapons into a single strategy of de-
terrence, we should not try to sweep 
all cyber weapons into a single strategy. 
Rather, we need to narrow our treatment 
of deterrence as it relates to cyberspace. 
The following suggests two approaches: 
one centered on particular cyber weap-
ons, the other on existing deterrence 
regimes. These are not exclusive, but 
rather orthogonal or complementary. 
Others have advocated tackling the de-
terrence issues by taking into account the 
geopolitical context12 and applying princi-
ples of tailored deterrence, both of which 
can be used with the ones suggested in 
this article.13
Deterrence for Classes 
of Cyber Weapons
The first approach is to focus on rela-
tively narrow classes of cyber weapons 
where deterrence might be feasible. 
For example, consider nuclear electro-
magnetic pulse weapons, sometimes 
referred to as nuclear EMPs or simply 
NEMPs. These are nuclear weapons 
that would be detonated at high alti-
tudes above Earth with the objective of 
damaging electronic devices rather than 
killing persons or blowing up buildings. 
Because so much critical infrastruc-
ture depends on computers and other 
electronic devices, the effects of a 
well-placed NEMP attack could be dev-
astating not only to cyberspace but also 
to all domains of activity and society as 
a whole. Testifying before Congress, 
former CIA Director James Woolsey 
noted that a nuclear warhead, launched 
with a medium-range missile from the 
Gulf of Mexico and detonating at an 
altitude of 400 kilometers, would gen-
erate an EMP field on the ground with 
a radius of 2,200 kilometers, “covering 
all of the contiguous 48 United States, 
causing a nationwide blackout and 
collapse of the critical infrastructures 
everywhere.”14
Because NEMPs are nuclear weapons, 
they automatically fall under the umbrella 
of nuclear deterrence. In addition, unlike 
nuclear weapons that detonate directly 
against their targets, their effects can be 
denied, as electronics can be hardened 
against the damaging radiation emitted 
by these weapons. While such hardening 
may not be practical for all electronic 
devices, it might be worth applying to 
critical infrastructures vital to society.
Numerous cyber weapons lend 
themselves to deterrence by denial, 
including any weapon that can be 
thwarted with the adoption of existing 
security technologies and practices. As 
noted earlier, many denial-of-service 
and phishing attacks can be stopped 
with anti-spoofing technologies that 
already exist. Deterrence strategy could 
focus on stimulating greater adoption of 
these technologies and on developing 
additional ones. In addition, many cyber 
weapons exploit vulnerabilities in existing 
systems for which there are patches or 
fixes. Deterrence strategy could promote 
more rapid and widespread adoption of 
these fixes. Strong defenses can convince 
would-be perpetrators that a cyber attack 
will likely fail and, therefore, is not worth 
implementing.
Some classes of cyber weapons might 
be suitable for deterrence by punishment. 
Even though many cyber attacks are 
difficult to attribute and therefore punish, 
others are not. Cyber activists operating 
under the banner of Anonymous, for 
example, used a cyber weapon called the 
Low Orbit Ion Cannon to conduct deni-
al-of-service attacks against targeted Web 
sites. This tool did not, however, give its 
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users anonymity, and 19 people who used 
it during “Operation Payback” in 2011 
against PayPal, Mastercard, and Visa were 
identified and arrested, including 14 in 
the United States.15
Still other types of cyber weapons 
might be suitable for deterrence by 
norms and agreements. NEMPs, as 
nuclear weapons, fall in this category. If 
a cyber weapon is ever developed that 




A second approach to deterrence in 
cyberspace is through the application of 
deterrence regimes established for other 
kinds of activity. As already noted, we 
can do this with NEMPs, drawing on 
existing strategies and mechanisms for 
nuclear deterrence. But we can also do 
it more broadly and apply established 
strategy for deterring state-level aggres-
sion and crime by nonstate actors.
LOAC is particularly relevant to de-
terring state-level aggression. Although it 
predates cyberspace, government officials, 
scholars in the area of international law, 
and cyber experts generally agree that 
it applies to cyberspace. A UN group 
of government experts affirmed this: 
“International law, and in particular the 
United Nations Charter, is applicable 
and is essential to maintaining peace and 
stability and promoting an open, secure, 
peaceful and accessible” cyberspace.16 
The Tallinn Manual, sponsored by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
offers rules for applying LOAC to cy-
berspace,17 and DOD has stated that its 
actions in cyberspace will be governed by 
LOAC and all other applicable domestic 
and international legal frameworks.18 
LOAC supports deterrence by both 
norms and punishment by establishing 
principles for the use of force by states 
and for responses by the international 
community to state acts of aggression.
In addition to LOAC, other interna-
tional agreements might serve to deter 
certain activity. One such agreement is 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, which 
requires participating nations to protect 
trade secrets. Both the United States 
and China are members of WTO, and 
in response to the indictments of five 
members of China’s People’s Liberation 
Army for stealing trade secrets, Senator 
Charles Schumer called on the U.S. 
representative to the WTO to file suit at 
the WTO against China for state-backed 
cyber espionage.19
Well-tempered statecraft can deter 
aggressive state behavior in all domains 
of warfare. Also, to the extent that the 
affairs of states are intertwined, especially 
Shelby Cobra—approximately 1,400-pound vehicle containing 500 pounds of printed parts made of 20 percent carbon fiber—produced by Big Area 
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economically, there is some deterrence 
by interdependency or entanglement; if 
one state harms another, it will also harm 
itself.
Crimes committed by nonstate actors 
have been deterred traditionally through 
norms via religious and moral teachings 
as well as crime statutes; by punishment 
via law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system; and by denial via fences, 
locks, alarms, guards, and other mecha-
nisms that control entry into protected 
spaces. In addition, surveillance devices 
such as security cameras can help catch 
criminals such as shoplifters, muggers, 
and vandals who would otherwise 
not be identified and caught, thereby 
strengthening deterrence by punishment. 
Community policing, especially in “hot 
spots,” and neighborhood watch groups 
can also deter street crime.
Cyber crimes can be deterred by 
the same types of mechanisms. In the 
United States, the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1986, together with its 
amendments and other laws that apply 
to cyberspace, set norms for acceptable 
behavior in cyberspace. Many of these 
norms appear in the domestic crime 
laws of other countries as well. In addi-
tion, they are included in the Council 
of Europe (COE) Convention on 
Cybercrime. As of March 2014, 42 coun-
tries had ratified the Convention and 11 
more had signed it, showing strong inter-
national consensus regarding much cyber 
activity.20 While these laws obviously have 
not deterred those persons who commit 
cyber crimes, they likely deter those who 
view themselves as law-abiding citizens.
At least one study has shown that 
deterrence by punishment applies to 
cyber crime. Researchers at the National 
University of Singapore found a 36 per-
cent reduction in cyber attacks relating to 
49 reports of government enforcement 
actions in eight countries.21 However, 
more studies are needed to validate (or 
refute) these results and to determine 
factors that can make a difference. While 
it would be overly optimistic to assume 
that the persons behind all cyber attacks 
could be caught and punished, improved 
methods of cyber forensics and attribu-
tion, coupled with greater international 
cooperation such as that facilitated by the 
COE Convention on Cybercrime, could 
lead to greater deterrence by punishment.
Deterrence by denial is practiced 
every day in cyberspace via cyber security 
mechanisms and practices, including the 
regular installation of security patches, the 
use of strong methods for authentication, 
and the application of firewalls, black and 
white lists, intrusion prevention systems, 
antivirus tools, encryption, and so forth. 
We can aim for even more effective cyber 
security in the future by placing greater 
emphasis on security during the design, 
development, installation, and operation 
of new cyber technologies, but it is not 
likely to ever be completely foolproof, for 
Research engineers use 3-D printer in their work at FDA (FDA/Michael J. Ermarth)
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much the same reason that crime overall 
will never be fully eliminated. Still, denial 
offers the best means of deterrence, 
whether in cyberspace or not, in those 
situations where it can be applied and is 
cost effective. Much of the literature on 
deterrence in cyberspace recognizes this.
Conclusions
Cyber technologies are inherently 
different from those that define the 
traditional domains of warfare. After 
all, they are used to move, process, and 
store digital objects across computer 
networks—not people and physical 
objects across land, sea, air, and space. 
But technology aside, cyberspace shares 
many of the same characteristics as 
other domains of warfare. All have both 
manmade and natural elements, and the 
malleability of all is subject to consid-
erable constraint. Importantly, all are 
domains of human practice, character-
ized by a wide range of activity by both 
state and nonstate actors, some of which 
is hard to attribute, and by a variety of 
weapons ranging in availability, cost, 
and effects produced.
Because cyberspace is such a rich do-
main, studies of “cyber deterrence” raise 
as many problems as would be raised by 
a comparable study of “land deterrence.” 
This does not mean that deterrence in 
cyberspace is impossible, only that a 
more focused approach is needed, as has 
been followed in traditional domains of 
warfare. One possible approach is to con-
sider classes of cyber weapons that lend 
themselves to deterrence. Another is to 
consider existing deterrence regimes, in-
cluding international regimes governing 
nation-states and domestic regimes gov-
erning nonstate criminal behavior. These 
approaches can be combined with others 
that are tailored to particular actors or 
geopolitical contexts. Together, they may 
offer a tractable approach to deterrence in 
cyberspace. JFQ
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